from vanishing and, most interestingly, they have not sacrificed their religious roots. This paper picks up the ball and asks: How does Christian Democracy adapt its religiously informed doctrine and policies in order to secure its survival in a secular environment?
The argument is that Christian Democratic parties have for decades engaged in a delicate balancing act between the secular requirements of modernity and their religious roots. Religion cannot simply be abandoned. Election studies consistently show that, despite constant secularisation in countries like Germany, religious voting still trumps economic voting. 11 However, the parties also have to respond to shifts in their electorate and economic environment. If the parties want to compensate for a slowly but constantly shrinking religious electorate, they have to attract new groups of voters that have evolved through female emancipation and the post-industrial transformation of society and economy. As this paper will show, the process of balancing between these two positions is far from smooth and peaceful.
The paper will explore how such rebalancing has unfolded against the backdrop of the paradigmatic reformulation of German Christian Democratic family policy and the subsequent family policy reforms of the 2000s.
12 By advancing the notion of 'modern unsecular politics', 13 the contribution shows that the repositioning of Christian Democratic politics surfaces not only as a conflict between secular modernisers and religious traditionalists. Instead, in the German case, the renegotiating of religiously informed norms brought a re-eruption of the interdenominational cleavage within the party between Protestants and Catholics. Successful modern unsecular politics therefore need interdenominational compromises to overcome these cleavages. These compromises are, in turn, highly relevant for the shape and form of Christian Democratic welfare policy. The findings of the paper, therefore, present a strong case for the reintroduction of the religious cleavage into the analysis of public policy.
Germany emerges as a telling case for modern unsecular politics because of its longstanding Christian Democratic tradition and its prototypical Christian Democratic welfare state.
14 During recent decades, Germany has seen the emergence of emancipation, secularisation and deindustrialisation -all of which constitute the forces that drive the new cultural environment. 15 Given these changes, one would have expected a rapid functional adaptation in family policy. However, the 'paradigmatic' reforms only happened in the mid-2000s. 16 As Germany is a denominationally mixed country (2011: 30.8 per cent Catholic, 30.3 per cent Protestant, 38.8 per cent others), 17 it allows one to observe how Protestants and Catholics differ when pursuing their paths to modernity.
The paper proceeds in three steps. First, it sketches the dilemmas of Christian Democracy in a new cultural environment. Second, it analyses the traditional Christian Democratic family policy and its roots in Catholicism. Third, it shows how the transition towards modern unsecular politics led to the re-eruption of the interdenominational cleavage between Catholics and Protestants within German Christian Democracy.
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN A NEW CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT
Van Kersbergen has for decades illuminated the connections between Christian Democracy and the Western European political economies. While his early work analysed the formation stages and the high times of continental welfare, his recent work has become increasingly intrigued with the reactions of Christian Democracy to the new cultural 442 GERMAN POLITICS environment of the 1970s. In van Kersbergen's own words, the puzzle is 'the survival of a political movement that should have been extinct a long time ago according to secularization theory'. 18 As van Kersbergen notes, despite the strong decline in religiosity, 'no linear association with Christian Democratic success' seems to exist. 19 Van Kersbergen's earlier explanation was that Christian Democratic politics have emancipated themselves from their religious roots. 20 They shifted their politics away from religious appeal towards systems of mediation. These systems of mediation were meant to reconcile the cross-class alliances of voters on which Christian Democratic parties relied. During the post-World War II era, Christian Democracy had built these systems of mediation into the continental European welfare regimes. 21 However, in the late 1990s, van Kersbergen argued that increasing fiscal pressure, demographic change and changes in the production regimes in most European countries would put severe material constraints on mediation. 22 Hence, even detached from religion, Christian Democracy would face hard times in the coming age of retrenchment.
Van Kersbergen's forecast of Christian Democratic doom had been too quick. He was certainly right in predicting that enhanced globalisation and retrenchment would lead to the fall of some Christian Democratic parties, like the Italian Democrazia Christiana (DC), which had become too strongly tied to their systems of mediation. However, he had underestimated the flexibility of Christian Democratic parties to respond and adapt to new challenges. 23 Esping-Andersen pointed out, in the late 1990s, that the survival of Christian Democratic parties depended on their potential to adapt to new socio-economic groups that emerge in the new cultural environment. 24 However, this paper argues that the success or failure of Christian Democracy in the 1990s and 2000s depended not only on its ability to incorporate new socio-economic cleavages, but also on how well they connected them to their former worldviews and constituencies. These former worldviews were heavily influenced by religious values and doctrines, inter-denominational conflicts and state -church conflicts. 25 While Christian Democratic parties have to address and capture new socio-economic strata that emerge throughout post industrialisation, they cannot allow themselves to lose their religiously informed core electorate. 26 Van Kersbergen addressed this dilemma by developing the concept of modern unsecular politics at the end of the 2000s. Modern unsecular politics 'is then the often uneasy attempt to strip off the explicitly and exclusively ideological baggage while at the same time reconstructing a new Christian inspired package of beliefs, values and norms'. 27 In other words, Christian Democratic parties reconstruct their religious norms and values to make them compatible with modernity. According to Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, their survival in a secular environment depends on how well Christian Democratic parties manage to develop such 'bridging strategies' between the secular and the religious.
RELIGION IN GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY
Taking a look at the denominational composition of Germany makes the thesis of modern unsecular politics plausible. In the 1950s, West Germany had a denominational balance of 50.6 per cent Protestants and 45 per cent Catholics. The denominational balance remained more or less the same in the 1960s and 1970s. However, 29 Exit poll data analysed by Elff and Roßteutscher from the federal elections between 1994 and 2009 shows that 10 per cent of the West German electorate is religious (regular church attendance). The numbers are significantly lower in East Germany, with just 3 per cent falling into that category. 30 In the same vein, the secular (seldom or never go to church) segment of voters is the largest category in the East, with 58 to 74 per cent. In the West, the secular group varies between 33 and 39 per cent. 31 The third group in the electorate are the occasional churchgoers. Counting for 50 to 60 per cent, they make up the largest segment of the West German electorate. The number of occasional churchgoers is significantly smaller in East Germany (23 to 38 per cent).
In addition, religion remains a very important issue among Christian Democratic party members. Data from 2006 points to a higher frequency of regular churchgoers among the Catholic members of the CDU. In a membership poll, 70 per cent of West and 64 per cent of East German party members indicated that religion was one of the foundational reasons of their personal existence while only 15 per cent in the East and 19 per cent in the West were willing to sacrifice the Christian 'C' from the party name. Of all party members, only 20 per cent in the West and 24 per cent in the East responded that they were secular (seldom or never go to church) while 28 per cent in the East and 21 per cent in the West considered themselves religious (regular church attendance). 32 The segment of occasional churchgoers is the largest block in the Christian Democratic party membership (59 per cent in the West and 48 per cent in the East). 33 The East German electorate is more secularised; however the situation reverses when we look at the party members. East German Christian Democrats are more religious in terms of regular church attendance than their West German counterparts.
The figures on the level of religiosity in the electorate and party members are corroborated by election studies. Despite the decline in church membership and church attendance, religion still trumps economic indicators as a vote predictor in Germany. Arzheimer points out that, while partisanship is declining constantly (and slowly), it is largely a 'secular decline of partisanship'. 34 In a collaborative study, Arzheimer and Schoen remark that 'the religious-confessional cleavage has still a strong impact on the electoral choice of West Germans in the federal elections between 1994 and 2005'. 35 However, significant denominational differences exist: Catholics overwhelmingly favour the Christian Democrats and the tendency to vote for the Christian Democrats increases with the intensity of the affiliation to the Catholic Church. Up until 2005, Protestants displayed an especially high affinity towards the Social Democrats. Similarly, the secular segment of the electorate also had stronger preferences for the Social Democrats. However, this has since changed -especially during the 2000s, when the secular segment of the electorate became more equally distributed among all parties. 36 
GERMAN POLITICS
Indeed, the voters with all kinds of religious affiliations are on the move. While Catholics are still overwhelmingly connected to the Christian Democrats, the Green party has become one which increasingly represents modern Protestantism both on the level of party elites and among the party members. The nomination of Katrin Göring-Eckardt, member of the high council of the Protestant Church, as a candidate for the 2013 elections through caucus is a case in point. 37 In a similar vein Angela Merkel pursued a strategy of moderate protestantisation of the Christian Democrats since she became party leader. This is increasingly starting to pay off among the Protestant electorate. Merkel managed to stop the massive decline, from 40 39 This indicates that the religious segments within the electorate are still very important for vote-seeking considerations for Christian Democracy in Germany.
Protestant and Catholic Christian Democrats differ from one another in the party as well as in the electorate. Protestants who never or seldom go to church are more frequent than among Catholics. Moreover, the segment that regularly (once a week) attends a service is much lower (5 per cent among Protestants, 12 per cent among Catholics). 40 Protestants have fewer problems with secular values and display a higher propensity to switch to the secular camp within the electorate compared with the Catholics who vote for the party.
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For this paper it is interesting to consider whether the difference between being affiliated to the Protestant or Catholic Church, as well as the level of affinity with secular values, leads to different preferences in family policy. This paper argues that it does and that there are a number of reasons to believe why this is so.
CHRSITIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FAMILY
Since Weber and his investigations of the 'Spirit of Capitalism', Protestantism has been interpreted as a religion that sees an individual's work ethic and asceticism, based on its predestination model, as a higher value than an organic-or familybased composition of society. Hence, one can argue that Protestants have a greater affinity towards a dual earner model instead of a male breadwinner model. 42 Protestants also do not have to deal with a centralised authority that defines the doctrinal base of the creed. This makes it more flexible in its ability to adapt to new trends in society. Moreover, there are positive examples for Protestant modernisation and adaptation to a new cultural environment on the international level. The Protestant Scandinavian countries have successfully introduced dual earner/care taker regimes since the 1970s. These role models have been repeatedly cited in the family policy reform process by Protestant Christian Democratic politicians during the 2000s. Furthermore, the new East German electorate had been socialised in a socialist dual earner society. However, reunification did not only reinforce the secular segment in German society but also abolished socialism in the parts of Germany that since the Kaiserreich had been considered the heartland of German Protestantism. 43 One can argue that even if the number of church members in East Germany had drastically decreased, 'Cultural Protestantism' 44 (Protestant values and norms) had survived. 45 However, of greater importance is the fact that the rooting of the male breadwinner model in Catholicism, and the Catholic sections of the Christian Democrats, is deeply entrenched in the history of the party.
THE MALE BREADWINNER MODEL AND CHIRSTIAN DEMOCRAY
The male breadwinner model has not always been the prime family model of German society. Up until the turn of the twentieth century, German society was based on dual income households. 46 It was only with the rise of the bourgeoisie at the end of the nineteenth century that people came to aspire to fulfil the role of the model male breadwinner. At the same time, the Catholic Church first started to incorporate the male breadwinner model into its worldview. Rerum Novarum, the first papal social encyclical from 1891, stated that '[p]aternal authority can neither be abolished nor be absorbed by the State', and added that it was sinful that 'mothers on account of the father's low wage to be forced to engage in gainful occupations outside the home to the neglect of their proper cares and duties, especially the training of children'. 47 Bourgeois standards and Catholic worldviews caused the male breadwinner model to spread as an ideal, but it only became a predominant social reality in the post-World War II period. After 1945, the Christian Democrats seized upon the male breadwinner model and enacted policies that made 'the housewife model of the male breadwinner family . . . the basis of West German family culture'. 48 The early Christian Democratic party manifestos promote the view that every 'adult and working human has the right to a salary that will make it possible for him to found and sustain a family'. 49 The Frankfurter Leitsätze, 50 one of the earliest party manifestos of the Christian Democrats, set out that 'men must . . . be the head of the family' and that the 'state must, by its economic and social policy, give him the opportunity to nurture his family in honour'. 51 These are provisions that come very close to the papal encyclical of 1891. These were more than mere Catholic catchphrases. The Christian Democrats also implemented them. 52 In order to further secure the support of the Catholic Church, the Christian Democrats built the male breadwinner model into the early family policy arrangements of the Federal Republic. Adenauer founded the first family ministry in 1953 and made the Catholic Josef Würmeling the responsible minister.
Würmeling opened his first parliamentary speech with the claim that 'the church was his best and most important comrade-in-arms'. 53 His policy was built on the confinement of women to the household and on the promotion of marriage in order to counter the increasing divorce rates in the 1950s that, according to Würmeling, would create moral havoc and increase the number of 'stray kids'. 54 The second family minister, a Catholic by the name of Bruno Heck, was also a concession to the church. Both ministers engineered the first institutions of the Federal Republic 446 GERMAN POLITICS in a way that made male breadwinner families the overwhelmingly dominant social reality. Christian Democrats manipulated the incentive structure for women so that they could only benefit if they stayed at home. 55 The tax break for married couples with children from 1949 (Kinderfreibetrag), the tax advantage for married couples from 1951, and the house ownership promotion laws and the family allowance law from 1955 (Kindergeld) were all part of this strategy. Even in light of the labour shortage of the early 1960s, the Christian Democrats did not alter their strategy. Industry demanded the entry of women into the job market but the Christian Democrats opted instead for attracting foreign workers (Gastarbeiter).
In contrast to the Catholics, the Protestant parts of the party never showed any substantial interest in family policy. As the male breadwinner model was a central (gendered) decommodifying aspect of the German welfare state, the Protestant party wing -with its strong affiliations to the employer camp -was opposed to it. For Protestant Ordoliberals, like Ludwig Erhard, economic policy was the best social policy. However, the Catholics within the party managed to keep the male breadwinner model in place. Until Angela Merkel became responsible for parts of the federal family policy (minster for women and youth) in 1991, all Christian Democratic family ministers had been Catholics. Up until reunification, day-care and the dual earner model were essentially a moral taboo in West Germany.
This was a development that also took place in other European countries with Christian Democratic legacies. In fact, Esping-Andersen states in his seminal contribution on the Three Worlds of Welfare capitalism that 'the corporatist regimes are also typically shaped by the Church, and hence strongly committed to the preservation of traditional family-hood. Social insurance typically excludes non-working wives, and family benefits encourage motherhood. Day care, and similar services are conspicuously underdeveloped'. 56 In contrast to liberal individualism and the collectivism of socialism, the Catholic organic perception of Social Capitalism has the family as the central reference point in society. Van Kersbergen found, in the mid-1990s, that 'Christian Democracy is positively related to the family bias in tax-benefit regimes' and continental regimes provide 'paid jobs for men, unpaid domestic labor for women'. 57 However, the male breadwinner model was not only appreciated by conservative men but also by Christian Democratic women. The party had a continuous advantage amongst female (mostly Catholic) voters. Wiliarty shows that '[u]ntil 1972, the CDU regularly received 8 per cent to 10 per cent more from female voters than from male voters'. 58 As Figure 1 shows, conservative female voters started to massively defect from the party from the late 1960s onwards. The reason was that female attitudes and lives started to change drastically during the emergence of the new cultural environment. The number of women enrolling in tertiary education increased steeply and, from the 1960s onwards, Germany started a reluctant transition towards a service economy. 59 Church membership and attendance eroded, which considerably diminished the framing potential of the Catholic Church in favour of the male breadwinner model. This posed serious challenges for the Christian Democrats. While the male breadwinner family policy had been a positive asset of the party in helping attract women, all of a sudden it started to do the opposite. However, the party could not simply switch to a new family policy because the old core Catholic electorate in West Germany, and its link with the Catholic Church, was crucial for the party's electoral success.
Therefore, the Christian Democrat's reform attempts during the 1970s and 1980s remained ambiguous. The 1985 programme puts forward that 'The CDU rejects a policy that confines women or men to certain roles or which does not want to recognize the differences between men and women'; 60 however, it also emphasises that 'It is a mistake of radical feminism to withdraw into a male free shelter and to dream of the matriarchy'
61
. A year before, the party had flown in an entire bare breasted Parisian dance ensemble to entertain the male delegates at the party congregation in Kiel. 62 With reunification in 1990, the adaptive pressures for the Christian Democrats regarding the male breadwinner family policy received a new spin. East German women were Protestant or secularised and had been socialised in a dual earner society. 63 However, Kohl's unmatched popularity as the 'unification chancellor' (Einheitskanzler) secured the electoral success of the Christian Democrats despite deteriorating female votes during the 1990s.
This changed after the breakthrough electoral victory of the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder in 1998 that ended 16 years of Christian Democratic chancellorship. Schröder had substantially altered the platform of the Social Democrats and re-launched the SPD as a third way alternative to the Christian Democrats. This was the (belated) Social Democratic response to the new cultural environment. Thus, there was now an alternative for those voters who were not in favour of the male breadwinner model. 
GERMAN POLITICS
However, the electoral defeat of Kohl in 1998 also opened a window of opportunity for the CDU. 64 Angela Merkel, the new general secretary of the party, declared her intention to make the CDU 'one of the most modern parties of Europe'. 65 The new credo of the Christian Democrats was to 'stop ordering people how they should lead their lives'. 66 For the East German Protestant Merkel, the conservative Catholic West German male breadwinner family policy became one of the central reform targets.
The result was the manifesto 'Lust for family' from 1999. It was portrayed as a Christian Democratic 'cultural revolution'. 67 Female commentators were astonished and remarked that 'the proposal is almost too good to be true'. 68 The programme opens with the statement that '[m]en can and want less and less to be the sole male breadwinner of the family' and it recognises 'that the simultaneous occupation of both partners is nowadays a broadly desired lifestyle model choice'. 69 The manifesto mentions that '[a] modern family policy cannot lead to a state supported institutionalisation of one sided gender patterns that lead to a work division between men and women'. 70 As an East German woman and the daughter of a Protestant priest, Angela Merkel had signalled a clear departure from the Catholic West German family policy model. However, these were to remain only words in the election manifesto. It would not take long before the new family policy position provoked a massive backlash from the Catholic Church and Catholic parts of the Christian Democrats.
FAMILY POLICY AS A CLASH BETWEEN RELIGIONS
In the 2002 elections, Edmund Stoiber from the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union (CSU) was filed as a joint candidate for CDU and CSU. Stoiber declared that modern family policy should become a major topic in his 2002 campaign to counter his own conservative image. 71 The 2002 election manifesto included claims for daycare expansion in order to make working and family life reconcilable. 72 When Stoiber announced the nomination of Katherina Reiche, a young Protestant and unmarried mother from East Germany, as family policy expert in his campaign team the cleavages between Protestants and Catholics became salient. 73 The Catholic Church was the first to react with bitter hostility. Cardinal Meisner from Cologne advised the Christian Democrats to scrap the 'C' from their name. 74 Many Catholics read Meisner's reaction to the nomination of the Protestant Reiche as 'one of the nails in the coffin of the electoral victory of the Christian Democrats'. 75 The Catholic Church publicly blackmailed the Christian Democrats by threatening to give a negative election recommendation (Hirtenbrief). 76 Cardinal Ratzinger, then the chief of the congregation in Rome, who later became Pope Benedict XVI, was cited as having 'great concern regarding the developments of German Christian Democracy'. 77 The pressure was so great that Ms Reiche had to get married, publicly announce it and take a negative position on partnership outside wedlock. 78 Stoiber was forced to considerably tone down his ideas on the new dual income/care taker model of Christian Democratic family policy in order to avoid a Hirtenbrief and risk losing the Catholic core vote. Having thus reinstated their traditional family policy position, the Christian Democratic party went into the 2002 elections -and lost.
The analysis of the Christian Democratic grande dame, Rita Süssmuth, after the 2002 election defeat was that 'the party gives itself a new perception of women but, when it comes down to it, it retracts'. 79 However, the surprising point about the conflict was that it was not one between traditionalists and modernisers, or chauvinists and feminists, but that the fault lines crystallised as a clear denominational line between Catholics and Protestants. The conservative Catholic regional prime ministers, like Teufel (Baden-Württemberg) and Vogel (Thuringia), argued that changing the family policy stance in the first place had boiled down 'to hawking the conservative silverware' and to 'driving the Union into oblivion'. 80 The Protestants around Merkel, for their part, argued that a new family policy cannot pay mere lip service if the party wanted to win elections. 81 In becoming the Christian Democratic candidate for the 2005 elections, Angela Merkel did not leave many doubts about her ambitions to reform family policy when she announced the appointment of the Protestant Ursula von der Leyen as family affairs spokesperson. The nomination of von der Leyen, who appeared to easily combine the motherhood of seven kids and her political career, was a sting for the traditional Catholics in the party. 82 When the technical details of minister von der Leyen's family policy reform plans became public, the Süddeutsche Zeitung commented on the party manifesto for the 2005 elections that 'it is striking that the traditional family picture is no longer granted a central place'. 83 The denominational cleavage within the Christian Democrats expanded again. 84 Prominent Catholic Christian Democrats were particularly vocal in expressing their concerns. 85 Peter Ramsauer, a Catholic from the Bavarian Christian Democrats, sarcastically called the new arrangement 'diaper volunteering' (Wickelvolontariat). 86 Marriage was highlighted as the basis of the Christian Democratic family concept by the Catholic prime minister of Hesse, Roland Koch, who declared at a party congress to standing ovations that he was 'no expert on patchwork' (referring to the popular science notion of the patchwork family). 87 The Catholic Church itself also expressed its discontent. The Catholic bishop Reinhardt Marx commented in an interview that 'politics is erring if it wants to make people believe that they can have everything at once: career, high income and children'. 88 Cardinal Meisner criticised the Christian Democratic family policy plans as 'pay-check politics' and put forward that the equation of 'the more day-care facilities, the more children' was wrong. 89 The Catholic bishop Walter Mixa called von der Leyen's family policy 'ideologically fatuous' and argued that 'her concept was reducing women to baby machines'. 90 In contrast to the Catholics, the Protestant Bishop and later head of the general congregation of the German Protestant Bishops, Margot Käßmann, stated that she 'could not understand the [Catholic] critique at all'. 91 The Catholic Bishop Marx commented, on the background of the new family policy, in an interview with Der Spiegel that '[t]hrough East Germany and through Angela Merkel the Union has become more Protestant' and criticised the 'strong position of the Protestants in the Christian Democratic leadership'. Why could the Protestants, in contrast to 2002, win the interdenominational struggle against the Catholics without fear of losing the Catholic vote? The difference is that the Protestant Angela Merkel could, in contrast to the Catholic Edmund Stoiber, use the economic interests of the Catholic Church to blackmail it. Figure 2 shows the development of the number of employees engaged by the Catholic Church in Germany. Figure 3 , meanwhile, charts the development of the employees of the German Caritas, the biggest welfare provider of the Catholic Church. The figures indicate that the Catholic Church employs roughly 600,000 people in Germany. This makes it the largest German private employer. The funding of Caritas is partly dependent on the contracts with public institutions for welfare provision. 93 A senior female member of the Christian Democrats, and long-term member of the committee on family affairs, described this situation as follows:
We knew that if we wanted to get this thing through, we had to get to terms with the Churches. The Protestants were easy. When von der Leyen sent me instead for the first time to present our new plans to the Catholic Bishops it seemed to me as if I was speaking to a brick wall. The Bishops sat in front of me and unanimously told me that what we wanted to do was witches brew. When I met them the second time and confronted them with the possibility of losing the four billion euros of federal funding for the day-care facilities the situation changed. The hardliners did of course not change their mind but it was enough to get a majority with the moderates in favour of the reform. 94 Therefore, it seems that the Protestants could implement their version of family policy at expense of the Catholics because von der Leyen could threaten the churches with serious cuts to their funding. The enactment of the new policy regime paid off for the Christian Democrats. Not only did they win the next federal elections in 2005 but they also recovered a substantial part of the female vote bonus that they had been losing continuously since the 1960s. 95 Seeleib-Kaiser stated that '[i]n the 2005 elections the Christian Democrats were able to narrow the gender gap and significantly improve their perceived competency in the field of family policy'. 96 Other commentators also saw a strong increase in the female vote for Christian Democrats. 97 The federal returning officer (Bundeswahlleiter) writes, in his report on the 2009 elections, that the Christian Democrats have become once again 'like in the 1950s to 1970s, a party preferred by women'. 98 With 4.8 point difference between the male and the female vote in 2009, the CDU was the party with by far highest female vote bonus in the electorate. 99 However, while the discrepancy between male and female votes is high, Table 1 indicates that it is not true that the Christian Democrats attracted a higher number of female voters. Instead, the male Christian Democratic vote plummeted while the female vote remained stable. However, if one compares the female vote across parties (Figure 4) , it then becomes obvious how crucial the stabilisation of the female vote was for the Christian Democrats. While the Social Democrats lost 17 per cent (35.5 per cent in 2005; 23.1 per cent in 2009) of their female vote, the Christian Democrats gained 1 per cent. The Christian Democrats were able to gain a remarkable surplus among East German women (plus 8 per cent); hence exactly those women that we assumed earlier to be most in favour of the Christian Democratic family policy reform of the 2000s. 100 What we have observed here is a Christian Democratic bridging strategy that reaches out to the East German Protestant electorate without losing the Catholic core of the party. This is a case of successful modern unsecular politics. 
GERMAN POLITICS
From Religion to Secular or to Modern Unsecular Politics? Unsecular politics emerged in Germany not as only a struggle between traditional religious and secular modernisers but also led to the re-eruption of the intraparty cleavage between Catholics and Protestants. However, the result of these unsecular politics was not a compromise between the different denominations, but was largely at the expense of the Catholics. A new Christian Democratic ideology that fused the values of both confessions and adapted them to modernity did not emerge.
The introduction of the home care allowance (Betreungsgeld) by the Christian Democratic-led coalition in 2013 corroborates this interpretation. It constituted the Catholic backlash to the introduction of the parental leave scheme in 2006 (Elterngeld). The Betreungsgeld is a lump sum of E100 (in 2014 it will increase to E150) per month paid to every family that decides not to put their child into day-care but to raise it at home during its first two years. While the opponents of this policy stigmatise it as oven bonus (Herdprämie), proponents of the measure argue that it is the only possible way to offer freedom of choice (Wahlfreiheit) and a means to protect the family from market forces and state intervention. 101 The heated public and party strife on the issue mirrors that preceding the introduction of the Elterngeld in 2006. Christine Haderthauer, the Catholic minister of social affairs in Bavaria, ordered her department to send out unrequested application forms to every Bavarian family in order to boost uptake rates for the home care allowance. 102 In contrast, the Protestant city-state of Hamburg threatened to sue the federal government at the federal court of justice if the Betreuungsgeld was introduced. Catholic Bishops demanded a doubling of the Betreuungsgeld while the Protestant federal minister of social affairs von der Leyen called it a 'catastrophe'. 103 Haderthauer labelled the controversy a 'cultural war', 104 thus putting it on the same level as the suppressive laws (Kulturkampfgestze) that the Protestant Bismarck had enacted against the Catholic minority of the Kaiserreich in the late nineteenth century. In the end, the Catholic parts of the Bavarian Christian Democrats (CSU) threatened to break the coalition with the federal Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Liberals (FDP) if the Betreuungsgeld was not introduced. 105 The Betreungsgeld is an antagonism. It should reflect a compromise between the two positions by remunerating care within the nuclear family -hence, making women perceive care as regular paid work. 106 However, it undermines the logic of the previous reforms of the Elterngeld and the day-care facility expansion. Arguably, it will be enough as a bridging strategy for the 2013 elections. However, the duality of Elterngeld and Betreuungsgeld marks not a sustainable fusion of two ideas, but rather the persistence of two old concepts within Christian Democracy. 107 
CONCLUSION
Religious explanations of welfare regime development are nothing new. In the early 1990s, Van Kersbergen established a connection between Catholic social doctrine, Christian Democracy and the prototypical continental European welfare state. 108 Manow added later 'that Protestantism -in contrast to the received wisdom in the literature . . . has contributed in a substantial and distinctive way to the development of the western welfare state'. 109 However, they are seldom evoked in the analysis of contemporary changes in public policy. The literature has so far largely advocated secular explanations for the shift in German family policy. 110 Functional explanations emphasise Germany's low fertility rate and the pressures that this forecast for the German social security system, 111 the emergence of new social risks (NSR) for women in an emerging service economy, 112 and the increasing demand for highly educated women on the German labour market. 113 Vote-seeking explanations of Christian Democratic family policy see the ideological change of the German Christian Democrats as the result of 'party modernization in response to electoral competition for female votes'. 114 Accounts focusing on the female substantive representation argue that, in the case of the Christian Democrats, 'the women's union, was moving from a primarily coffee serving society to a significant internal party actor'. 115 However, taking a second look reveals that most of these secular explanations are not entirely secular. Seeleib-Kaiser mentions that 'the strongest opposition came from senior Catholic clergy, such as Bishop Walter Mixa'. 116 Fleckenstein admits that the Bavarian Christian Democrats 'might have good reasons to put a stronger emphasis on the preservation of traditional families because of the weight of Catholicism in Bavaria'. 117 Wiliarty emphasises not only the ascendance of women in the party but also the intersecting identity of these women as Protestants for the new gender policy of the CDU. 118 
GERMAN POLITICS
Indeed, this paper showed that in contemporary politics the religious cleavage is not confined to post-material cultural markers such as minarets, crucifixes, gay marriage or abortion as most scholarship assumes today. Instead, religious conflict still determines the material aspects of public policy formation in Germany. Faith is not only a good predictor of vote choice but also of Christian Democratic public policy in Germany. The cleavage does not run between traditionalists and modern secularisers, as the thesis of modern unsecular politics has suggested so far. Instead, the paper detected the emergence of a denominational cleavage between Catholic traditionalists and progressive Protestants. The discussions around the policy reform of 2006 (Elterngeld) and the introduction of the home care allowance (Betreuungsgeld) in 2013 showed that this cleavage can be overcome. However, the contrarian logic of Elterngeld and Beterungsgeld indicates that the current interdenominational compromise does not represent a new congruent ideology of Christian Democratic family policy. It works because Germany can afford to run both policy schemes at the moment. Time will show what will happen to the compromise under austerity.
Whether these findings can travel beyond Germany to the other cases of continental European Christian Democracy in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands or Switzerland remains to be investigated. Arguably, Christian Democracy in denominationally split countries has an easier time in adapting to new cultural environments. Those parties have been, since their very foundation, accustomed to internal debates and discussions between the denominations that make them more flexible in the search for compromises. These compromises of modern unsecular politics are subject to constant renegotiation and contestation. However, they ensure a healthy and constant evolution of the party's platforms and policies in a changing environment. In contrast, the experience of the Italian Democrazia Christiana (DC) suggests that mono-denominational Christian Democracy runs a higher risk of non-adaptation and implosion. 
